EMPLOYMENT AT WILL: THE "AMERICAN
RULE" AND ITS APPLICATION IN ALASKA
PENNY LOZON CROOK*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, American courts have adopted a laissez-faire attitude toward employment contracts, favoring a presumption that contracts of indeterminate length are terminable at will. In recent years,
however, the courts and legislatures of many states have created exceptions to the American rule, which presumes that an employment
contract of unspecified duration is terminable at the will of either
party, in order to protect employees from unreasonable actions by employers. Alaska, while it has not explicitly repudiated the at-will
doctrine, has taken major strides toward reforming the law of employment contracts.
Several recent cases of the Alaska Supreme Court' have examined
the American rule of employment relationships. This article examines
the American rule and the growing exceptions to the rule, with particular reference to applications and trends in Alaska. Part II contains
an overview of the American employment-at-will rule and its historical development. Part III examines the development of exceptions to
the rule, with special emphasis on judicial exceptions created during
the past ten or fifteen years. Part IV focuses on the application of the
rule and its exceptions in Alaska. Finally, Part V concludes with some
recommendations for the future of the employment-at-will doctrine in
Alaska.
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1. See Glover v. Sager, 667 P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1983); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666
P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663
P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983). These cases are discussed in detail in Part IV infra.
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II. THE "AMERICAN RULE:" EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

The traditional English rule on the duration of employment contracts was clear: in the absence of evidence to the contrary, an employment relationship of indefinite duration was presumed to be a
yearly hiring. 2 This rule was both mandated by statute 3 and endorsed
by Blackstone. 4 Nevertheless, early American cases on employment
contracts did not adopt the English presumption of a yearly hiring.5
Instead, the American courts employed an ad hoe examination of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the creation of the employment
relationship. 6
The ad hoc approach is illustrated in Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris,7 where, after examining the facts and circumstances at issue, the
Michigan Supreme Court concluded that an indefinite hiring was for a
one-year term. Harris had given up another job in order to accept a
supervisory position at the defendant's mine. In the negotiations preceding his acceptance, Harris stated that he would prefer a yearly contract, and the defendant's agent replied that he would see that Harris
was "all right." Eight months after Harris began work, he was fired.
In his subsequent action for breach of contract, a jury awarded damages for the remainder of a one-year term. The supreme court affirmed, holding that, considering all of the circumstances, particularly
the fact that Harris's salary was expressed in terms of an annual rate,
the jury properly could have found that the parties had agreed on a
contract for a year's employment.
2. See, eg., Emmons v. Elderton, 4 H.L. Cas. 624, 10 Eng. Rep. 606 (1853).
Many of the English cases are collected in Annot., 11 A.L.R. 469, 470 (1917).
3. Statute of Laborers, 1349, 23 Edw. 3, ch. 1, and 1562, 5 Eliz., ch. 4, cited in
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118, 119 n.6 (1976).
4. Blackstone stated the rule in these terms:
If the hiring be general, without any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the
servant shall serve, and the master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective seasons, as well when there is work to be done as
when there is not.
I BLACKSTONE, COMMENT4RES 425 (1825).
5. Normally, the basis for American common law rules can be found in the English common law on the subject, since courts faced with a case of first impression
usually looked to the English case law for guidance. See, e.g., Beach v. Mullin, 34
N.J.L. (5 Vroom) 343 (1870).
6. In Kansas Pac. Ry. v. Roberson, 30 Colo. 142 (1876), for instance, the court
expressly refused to follow the English rule, noting that the English rule was based on
custom and usage and that, in the case before it, there was no evidence of any custom
as to length of service.
7. 24 Mich. 115 (1871).
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The "facts and circumstances" test, however, had its drawbacks. 8

The need for a factual inquiry precluded summary disposal of employment contract cases. Case-by-case adjudication also presented the

danger that factually similar cases would be decided inconsistently.
Thus, although the English presumption was not well-suited to the

American climate of rapid industrialization and laissez-faire economic
theory, the interests of judicial efficiency and uniformity demanded the

application of some presumption.
The need for a presumption was addressed by a "mysterious" 9

New York attorney and writer, Horace Gray Wood. In his 1877 treatise on the law of master and servant, Wood differentiated the American and English approaches, stating that "[w]ith us, the rule is
inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at

will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden

is upon him to establish it by proof."1 0
In support of this rule, Wood cited four American cases and two
Scottish cases. In fact, none of these cases actually supported his
proposition; the cases were either irrelevant to the proposition or, as in
the case of FranklinMining Co. v. Harris,they supported only the use
of a facts-and-circumstances test." Nevertheless, Wood's rule filled

the void left by the repudiation of the English rule and reflected contemporary American thought on the legal relation of master and ser13
vant.' 2 Accordingly, Wood's rule was gradually adopted by courts
8. See Field v. Dillon, Delay and Uncertainty in Judicial Administration, 8

A.B.A. REPS. 323 (1885).
9. One author noted that although a book review of Wood's earlier treatise on
the law of nuisance spoke of him as an Albany attorney, he was not listed among the
members of the New York State Bar Association. Feinman, supra note 3, at 226 &
n.60. It may also be noted that, although Wood was a frequent contributor to legal
periodicals in the years prior to 1887, see 1 INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS TO 1887,
at 634 (1888), there is no record of his contributions in the succeeding indices. Moreover, although the legal periodicals of the time frequently published obituaries, see,
e.g., 1 GREEN BAG 177 (1889), no record of Mr. Wood's obituary appears.
10. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 145, at
272 (1877).
11. For a discussion of the actual holdings of the six cases, see Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., Inc., 408 Mich. 579, 602 n.14, 292 N.W.2d 880, 886
n.14 (1980).
12. This attitude was illustrated by cases from the United States Supreme Court,
which endorsed laissez-faire economic theory under the guise of substantive due process. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which the majority opinion prompted Mr. Justice Holmes's retort that "The Fourteenth Amendment does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics ....

[A] Constitution is not intended to

embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation
of the citizen to the state or of laissezfaire." Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
13. Apparently the first case to follow Wood's rule was Martin v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895), in which the court stated that "[t]he
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and legislatures 14 throughout the country until eventually it became
accepted as "the American rule" of employment at will. 15
While satisfying the needs for judicial efficiency and consistency,
the employment-at-will rule and its subsequent elaborations made possible abuse and overreaching by employers. Two subsidiary factors
combined with the at-will rule to enhance this danger. The first
sprang from the maxim that evil motives alone cannot make unlawful
an otherwise lawful act. 16 Thus, since an at-will employee could be
fired at any time without cause, the courts refused to intervene even
when the discharge was for a morally reprehensible reason. 17 For instance, in Comerford v. InternationalHarvester Co., '8 the Alabama
Supreme Court refused to provide relief to an employee who allegedly
had been fired because his supervisor was unable to "alienate the affections" of the employee's wife. The rule of ignoring the employer's intent reached its zenith in the United States Supreme Court. In Adair
v. United States' 9 and Coppage v. Kansas,20 the Court struck down
legislation designed to protect employees from discharge motivated by
employers' hostility toward their union affiliations or activities. In
holding that such legislation impaired the right of employer and employee alike to contract freely, the Court raised the employment-atwill doctrine to constitutional status.
The second factor that enhanced the danger of abuse by employers was the use of formalistic contract interpretation as a bar to the
enforcement of employers' promises. As applied to employment contracts, this interpretation began with the premise that the at-will rule,
by its terms, applied to all contracts for an indefinite term of employment. Since the duration of a contract for "permanent" or "lifetime"
employment could not be determined at its inception, the courts reasoned that such a contract was for an indefinite term and therefore
decisions on this point in the lower courts have not been uniform, but we think the
rule is correctly stated by Mr. Wood." Id. at 121, 42 N.E. at 417.
14. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 2922 (West Supp. 1984), which is the current
version of a statute originally enacted in 1899.
15. See, e.g., Singh v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 554 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1976), in which
the court decided a case as to the duration of an employment contract through the
application of the "American doctrine."
16. See Johnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 158 Wis. 56, 147 N.W. 32 (1914) ("Malice
makes a bad case worse, but does not make wrong that which is lawful.").
17. See Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1894), overruled on
other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915), in which the
court stated the oft-repeated maxim that at-will employees may be fired "for good
cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong."
18. 235 Ala. 376, 178 So. 894 (1938).
19. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
20. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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terminable at will. 21 Courts held that, because it would be unjust to

force an employee to remain in a "permanent" employment relationship, an employer's promise to retain an employee permanently was
illusory. Thus, the promise was unenforceable for lack of mutuality of
obligation. 22 The courts held that such a contract could be mutually
consideration,
binding only if the employee gave some independent
23
apart from his services, for the employer's promise.
III.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL RULE

The formerly pervasive influence of the at-will rule has been limited, particularly during the past fifty years, by specific legislative and
judicial exceptions. Although the judicial exceptions to the rule are
difficult to categorize clearly, the exceptions have been divided into
four groups for purposes of this article: legislative exceptions; exceptions based on public policy; exceptions dealing with the rule in terms
of implied-in-fact contracts; and exceptions applying an implied-in-law
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
A.

Legislative Exceptions

The exceptions to the at-will rule that affect the largest number of
employees are statutory. The first major statutory exception applicable to private employers 24 was the National Labor Relations Act of
1935,25 which protected from discharge employees who joined labor
organizations. 26 The other major federal statutory exception arises
from statutes which forbid the discharge of, or other discrimination
against, employees on the basis of age, 27 handicap, 28 race, color, sex,
21. See, e.g., Smith v. Beloit Corp., 40 Wis. 2d 550, 162 N.W.2d 585 (1968).
22. See, e.g., Rape v. Mobile & O.R.R., 136 Miss. 38, 50, 100 So. 585, 587 (1924).
23. See, e.g., Dotson v. F.S. Royster Guano Co., 207 N.C. 635, 178 S.E. 100
(1935), in which the court found sufficient additional consideration in the employee's
abandonment of a right to sue the employer.
24. Public employees, on both the federal and state levels, are generally covered
by civil service protections or by the due process requirements of the fifth and four-

teenth amendments, and thus are not employees at will. To the extent that public
employees are employees at will, the exceptions discussed here would generally be
applicable to them.
25. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87

(1982)).
26. An earlier attempt to secure such protections for railway employees, Act of
June 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 424, was invalidated by the United States Supreme Court in
Adair. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the operative provisions of
the NLRA in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
27. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
28. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-795 (1982).

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:23

national origin, or religion. 29 In addition, a number of federal statutes
offer protection against discharge for specific classes of employees, 30
such as those whose wages have been garnished 3 or those who report

violations of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act. 32

A number of state statutes also protect private sector employees 33
who are discharged for certain specific reasons. Most prevalent are
restrictions on discharge based on labor union activities 34 or characteristics such as race, sex, religion, age, and handicap. 35 There are several other state statutes ranging from the unique, such as Louisiana's
prohibition against the discharge of employees who take time off to
participate in Olympic or Pan American athletic contests, 36 to the
widely accepted, such as those forbidding the discharge of employees
for serving on juries, 37 filing claims for workers' compensation, 38 refusing to participate in performing abortions, 39 or reporting violations
of certain statutes. 4° A more recent phenomenon is the enactment in a
few states of more generalized statutes that protect the rights of virtually all "whistleblowers. '41
While the statutory protections afforded to at-will employees are
not uniform, and in many instances offer only minimal protection
against unjust discharge, 42 they represent at least a partial check on
43
the employer's abuse of the power to "fire at will."

29. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1982).
30. See generally L. LARSON & P. BOROWSKY, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 10.53[1]
(1985).
31. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1674 (1982).
32. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1982).
33. See supra note 24.
34. See, eg., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44.808 (1981).
35. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 453. 101 et seq. (1967).
36. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:431 - :435 (West Supp. 1984).
37. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-8.1 (1983).
38. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1979).
39. See, eg., KY. REv. STAT. § 311.800(5)(b) (1981).
40. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 6310, 6311 (West Supp. 1984) (occupational
safety act); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 408.395 (1967) (minimum wage law).
41. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West Supp. 1984).
42. For instance, in Kansas, the penalty for discharging an employee who takes
time off for National Guard duty is limited to a $50 fine. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48.322
(1983). The courts disagree on whether such statutes are exclusive. Compare Hentzel
v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982) (holding that penalties
in state OSHA act do not preclude private suit by discharged employee) with Portillo
v. G.T. Price Prods., Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 285, 182 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1982) (holding
that administrative remedy under state workers' compensation statute precludes
wrongful discharge action based on that statute).
43. It has been suggested that this employer power should be restricted even further by federal or state legislation mandating a "good cause" standard for the discharge of all employees, see Steiber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge:
The Need for a FederalStatute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 319 (1983); Note, Reforming
At-Will Employment Law: A Model Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 389 (1983). The
enactment of such statutes seems to be highly unlikely, however, given the political
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Judicial Exceptions

1. Public Policy Exceptions. The first case to enunciate a public
policy exception to the at-will rule was Petermann v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,44 decided by the California Court of Appeals in 1959. Petermann alleged that he was fired because he refused
to follow his supervisor's order to commit perjury when testifying
before a legislative committee. Relying on the at-will rule, the trial
court sustained the defendant's demurrer. The court of appeals reversed, holding that California's clear public policy against the subornation of perjury should be enforced at all costs, even if it interfered
with the at-will doctrine.4 5 Although Petermann represented a radical
departure from the traditional at-will rule, the case was virtually ignored outside California for over a decade. 4 6 In fact, it was not even
mentioned in the seminal law review article on the subject,4 7 in which
the author suggested that the potential for abuse by employers under
the at-will rule could only be checked by recognition of a cause of
action in tort for abusive discharge.
Until 1973, the idea of judicial exceptions to the at-will
rule was confined to a handful of California cases48 and a purely
theoretical law review article. Then, within the span of two
years, the Supreme Courts of Indiana, 49 New Hampshire,50 and
realities of the American political process; existing associations of employers, such as
Chambers of Commerce, could be easily mobilized to lobby against such laws, while
the majority of employee organizations are labor unions, which would probably not be
impelled to lobby in favor of such legislation since their members are generally already
protected by just cause provisions.
44. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 255 (1959).
45. The arguments against finding a public policy exception to the at-will rule
were stronger in California than in many other states, since the at-will rule has been
codified in California since 1899. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 and historical note
(Vest Supp. 1984).
46. Petermann, however, was followed in subsequent California cases. See Glenn
v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961)
(union activity); Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970)
(asserting right to receive minimum wage). But see Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App.
2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960) (no remedy for employee fired because ofjury service).
47. Blades, Employment at Will vs. IndividualFreedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1967).

48. See supra note 45. One possible reason why these cases received little note
outside California may be that they represented only the view of the intermediate
court of appeals. The Supreme Court of California did not address the issue until
1980, when it endorsed the results of Petermannand its progeny in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 620 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
49. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973)
(holding that the discharge of an employee in retaliation for filing workers' compensation benefits violated public policy).
50. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (holding
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Oregon 51 each decided that the at-will rule was subject to exception
when the discharge of an at-will employee offended a fundamental
public policy of the state. Following this initial flurry of decisions, the
number of jurisdictions expressing a willingness to apply a public policy exception steadily increased.5 2 For example, courts have held that
public policy is offended when an employee is discharged because he
or she files a workers' compensation claim,5 3 serves on a jury,5 4 declines an invitation to "go out" with a supervisor,5 5 participates in a

criminal investigation,5 6 or refuses to participate in an antitrust con-

spiracy 57 or in a violation of consumer credit5 8 or food packaging
laws.5 9 Most courts require a showing that the employee's discharge
violated a "clear mandate" of public policy, 6° usually with the proviso
that the discharge of an employee because she refused to "go out with" her foreman
violated public policy).
51. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (holding that there was a
violation of public policy when an employee was discharged because she served on a
jury against her employer's wishes).
52. In some instances, courts have rejected the plaintiff's claim on the merits but
have nevertheless taken advantage of the opportunity to make clear their intention to
apply the public policy exception in future cases. See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 835 (1983).
53. See, e.g., Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981)
(court followed "a small band of renegade opinions" in deciding to allow an exception). Contra Dockery v. Lampert Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cert.
denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978), overruled by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1
(1979).

54. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). Contra Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980), overruled by ALA. CODE § 12-16-8.1
(1983) (enacted 1980).
55. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); see also
Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that discharge of
female employee who refused to sleep with a foreman violated the public policy of
Arkansas as expressed in its laws against prostitution). Cf Wiley v. Georgia Power
Co., 134 Ga. App. 187, 213 S.E.2d 550 (1975), overruled by Georgia Power Co. v.
Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978). In Wiley, the Georgia Court of Appeals
found a cause of action for a female employee, fired because she refused her supervisor's sexual advances, by the simple expedient of never discussing the at-will rule. The
state supreme court tactfully denied review of the case, contenting itself with overruling it three years later.
56. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981).
57. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 2d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980).
58. Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982).
59. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
60. See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464
(1981).
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that the relevant public policy be expressed in state or federal statutes
or regulations. 6 1 This requirement, however, is sometimes applied
rather loosely. For instance, the Supreme Court of Oregon recently
upheld a public policy exception where the source of the public policy
was neither a statute nor a regulation. 62 The public policy can most
accurately be characterized as based on the Biblical commandment:
'6 3
"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.
The trend toward the application of the public policy exception is
by no means universal. Some state supreme courts expressly refuse to
find a public policy exception, usually on the ground that the creation
of exceptions is a job better left to the legislature. 64 Perhaps the most
notable decision in this regard is that of the New York Court of Appeals in Murphy v. Home ProductsCo. 65 Ironically, the court in Murphy failed to note that the at-will rule itself entered the law of New
York not by legislative enactment, but by judicial adoption of Wood's
66
rule.
2. Exceptions Based on Implied-in-Fact Contracts. The effect of
the at-will rule is broadened by the rule that a promise not to discharge except for good cause is enforceable only if the employee has
given independent consideration. 67 The result is that, in many instances, employers may make promises to their employees-or prospective employees-without fear that the promises are enforceable.
Some courts reason that because employment relationships of an unspecified duration can be terminated at will, the employment contract
provides no basis for the employer's promises of job security. 6 Other
courts enforce employers' promises regarding employment security
only where independent consideration was given by the employee, on
the theory that the at-will doctrine otherwise renders employers'
promises unenforceable for lack of mutuality. 69 Finally, where the
61. See, eg., Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 573, 335 N.W.2d at 840 (1983).
62. See Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 681 P.2d 114 (Or. 1984).
63. Exodus 20:16 (King James). The Delaney court did not, however, cite the
Bible; it found the relevant public policy in two state constitutional provisions that
"indicate that a member of society has an obligation not to defame others." 681 P.2d
at 118.
64. See, eg., Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981).
65. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
66. See supra note 13. The dissent in Murphy characterized the Martin court's
adoption of Wood's rule as "bizarre." 58 N.Y.2d at 308 n.1, 448 N.E.2d at 93 n.1,
461 N.Y.S.2d at 239 n.1 (Meyers, J., dissenting in part).
67. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Murphine v. Hospital Auth., 151 Ga. App. 722, 261 S.E.2d 457

(1979).
69. See, e.g., Russell & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909, 915-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965).
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employer's promise of job security is embodied in a personnel handbook or similar document, it is often held that the handbook does not
form part of the employment contract, either because it can be unilaterally amended by the employer 70 or because the employee received it
after starting
work and thus could not have relied on it in accepting
71
the job.
In several recent cases, however, courts have taken a less formalistic view of contract law in order to give effect to employers' promises
of job security set forth in personnel handbooks. In these cases, the
courts held that a contract has been formed in accordance with the
terms of the handbook. The requirement of mutuality of obligation
has usually 72 been dismissed as a rule of construction, rather than a
rule of substance, 73 or as a "forbidden inquiry into the adequacy of
consideration." 74 Some courts reason that, because employees are free
to depart at will, their forbearance in not leaving when they receive an
employee handbook constitutes adequate consideration for the enforceability of its provisions. 75 Arguments that statements in personnel handbooks are not enforceable because they may be unilaterally
withdrawn or amended are typically rebutted with comments such as
those of the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Michigan, Inc. :76
While an employer need not establish personnel policies or practices, where an employer chooses to establish such policies and
practices and makes them known to its employees, the employment
relationship is presumably enhanced .... No pre-employment negotiations need take place and the parties' minds need not meet on
the subject; nor does it matter that the employee knows nothing of
the particulars ...or that the employer may change them unilaterally. It is enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its own
interest, to create an environment in which the employee believes
that, whatever the personnel policies and practices, they are estab77
lished and official at any given time. ....
70. See, eg., Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779
(1976).
71. See, eg., Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982).
72. But cf Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 24 111. App. 2d 1056,
322 N.E.2d 574 (1974) (the court impliedly required a finding of mutuality of obligation before it gave effect to the non-profit agency's personnel procedures, but found
such mutuality in a portion of a policy manual that provided for the forfeiture of
accumulated vacation pay by an employee who quit without notice).
73. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., Inc., 408 Mich. at 600, 292
N.W.2d at 885.
74. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983).
75. See, e.g., Yartzoffv. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 657, 576
P.2d 356, 359 (1978).
76. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
77. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
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3. Exceptions Based on the Implied-in-Law Covenant of Good Faith
andFairDealing. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
has become an important part of modem contract law. It is part of all
commercial contracts under the Uniform Commercial Code by virtue
of Section 1-203 of the Code. 78 This covenant is also frequently applied by courts in the context of litigation between insurers and their
insureds. 79 Nevertheless, despite language in some opinions to the effect that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in all
contracts,8 0 most courts are hesitant to apply the concept to at-will
employment contracts, largely because of the traditional judicial reluctance to subject employers' legitimate business decisions to court
scrutiny."'
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however, has
been extended to protect at-will employees in a few limited situations.
One of these situations is illustrated by an early case, Zimmer v. Wells
Management Corp.8 2 The parties in Zimmer had entered into both an
express employment contract for a one-year term and a stock option
agreement by which the employee's right to the stock was to vest over
the first five years of his employment. The parties never agreed on the
terms of subsequent employment contracts, and the employee, Zimmer, was fired after approximately eighteen months of work. Allegedly, he was fired because he "didn't mix well in the swinging
environment" of the company. The court held that Zimmer's partial
payment on the stock option obligated the employer to deal in good
83
faith with regard to Zimmer's subsequent employment contracts.
In one state, California, the courts have invoked an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment-at-wil context
simply on the basis of an employee's long years of satisfactory service
78. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978).
79. See, eg., Comunale v. Traders Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 193

(1958).
80. See, e.g., Moore v. Home Ins. Co., 601 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying

Arizona law).
81. See, e.g., Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1983).
[T]o imply into each employment contract a duty to terminate in good faith
would seem to subject each discharge to judicial incursions into the amorphous concept of bad faith. We are not persuaded that protection of employees requires such an intrusion on the employment relationship or such
an imposition on the courts.
Id. at 377, 625 P.2d at 629.
82. 348 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
83. Although New York has since rejected the idea that there is an implied covenant of good faith in all employment contracts, see Murphy v. Home Prods. Co., 58
N.Y.2d 293, 488 N.E.2d 56, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983), the result in Zimmer may still
be good law, since the decision rests on the plaintiff's expenditure of funds for the
option contract, i.e., on at least partial consideration independent from the services to
be rendered.
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with the employer. In the two primary cases expressing this rule,
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.8 4 and Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,8 5
the employees spent eighteen and thirty-two years, respectively, with
their employers and, in both instances, consistently received promotions and other indications that their work was satisfactory. Certainly,
requiring that employees with this kind of work record be fairly
treated comports with traditional notions of justice and equity.
The other situations in which courts have applied the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing are those in which an employer
has discharged an employee in order to deprive him of a promised
reward for his work. In the leading case, Fortune v. National Cash
Register Co., 8 6 company rules entitled Fortune to a commission on all
sales made in his district. However, when a multi-million dollar sale
was made in Fortune's territory, Fortune was notified that his job was
terminated as of the day after the sale. He was kept on the payroll in
another capacity for a few months and received a portion of the commissions on the large account, but eventually he was fired and never
received all of the commissions to which he was entitled. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing precluded the discharge of an employee for the purpose of depriving him of commissions.
Subsequently, Fortune has been applied in Massachusetts 8 7 and elsewhere 8 to prevent an employer from depriving an employee of the
financial fruits of his labors.
IV.

THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL RULE AND EXCEPTIONS IN
ALASKA

The employment-at-will rule is not codified in the Alaska statutes, nor has it been the basis of supreme court decisions sanctioning
employer abuse of employee rights.8 9 Nevertheless, the existence of
the rule has been acknowledged in Alaska. For example, in Long v.
Newby, 90 the supreme court explicitly stated that the plaintiff was an
employee at will, 9' thus leading to the assumption that the "American
rule" applies to all indefinite term contracts in Alaska.
84. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
85. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). But cf Shapiro v. Wells
Fargo Realty Advisors, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (Ct. App. 1984) (no implied covenant prevented discharge of employee who had spent only 3' years with employer).
86. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
87. See Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, 386 Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d 351
(1982).
88. See Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983), which is discussed in
more detail in text accompanying notes 100-104 infra.
89. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
90. 488 P.2d 719 (Alaska 1971).
91. Id. at 722.
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There are a few statutory protections for at-will employees in
Alaska. Two of these statutes parallel existing federal laws: the statute protecting those who protest violations of the state wage and hour
law92 and the Human Rights Law, which prohibits terminations of an
employee on the basis of race, religion, color, sex, or national origin, as
93
well as in retaliation for participation in the statute's enforcement.
The Human Rights Law also prohibits most terminations on the basis
of age, physical handicap, marital status, changes in marital status,
pregnancy, or parenthood, although discrimination on these bases is
prohibited only when "the reasonable demands of the position do not
require distinction."' 94 The only other protections for at-will employees found in the Alaska statutes are those that require employers to
provide time off for voting9 5 and forbid the use of lie detector tests as a
96
condition of employment.
Significantly, the legislature has not acted to prohibit many of the
abuses that have figured prominently in reported cases. There are no
statutory prohibitions on the discharge of private sector employees
based on their service on a jury97 or their assertion of the right to
receive workers' compensation. There is no "abortion conscience"
statute, and no statutory protection for whistleblowers. As to judicial
exceptions, the Alaska Supreme Court has not explicitly considered
the various public policy exceptions to the American rule of at-will
contracts. Nonetheless, the court's decisions in three recent contract
cases 98 indicate its willingness to depart from the traditional at-will
rule in the interests of protecting employees from abusive discharge.
The first of these decisions, Mitford v. de Lasala,99 is perhaps
more notable for the remedy suggested by the court than for its holding. Mitford had spent approximately nine years as an employee of
various corporations controlled by Robert de Lasala, when Robert's
son, Ernest, assigned Mitford to be the accountant for two family investment corporations. According to letters sent by both Ernest and
92. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.140 (1984).
93. Id. §§ 18.80.010-.300 (1982).
94. Id. § 18.80.220.
95. Id. § 15.56.100 (1982).
96. Id. § 23.10.037 (1981).
97. But cf id. § 39.20.340 (1980), which provides such protection to public
employees.
98. Note that public policy exceptions are generally held to sound in tort, even in
states that have not yet adopted a public policy exception. See, e.g., Johnston v.
Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Kan. 543, 545 P.2d 312 (1976). But see
Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 573, 335 N.W.2d at 840 (1983) (adopting public policy
exception to sound in contract).
99. 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983).
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Robert at the time of this transfer, Mitford was to work for both corporations and their affiliates and was to receive ten percent of the profits of the two corporations "as computed in accordance with the rules
of Federal Income Tax BUT with a minimum guaranteed drawing allowance of $850.- per month. . . ."00 Mitford worked for the family
companies for sixteen more years, receiving only his drawing allowance. When Mitford finally asserted his right to ten percent of the
profits earned by the companies over the years, he was discharged.
The trial court granted summary judgment, deciding that Mitford was
contractually entitled to $35,545.10 in profits.
In reviewing Mitford's contention that he had been discharged in
order to deprive him of his rightful share of the profits, the supreme
court followed Massachusetts's lead in Fortune,101 stating that
"Mitford's employment contract contained an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. In particular, good faith and fair dealing
in this case would prohibit firing Mitford for the purpose of preventing
him from sharing in future profits of [the two companies]." 10 2 Remanding the case so that the corporate employers could "offer evidence, if it exists, tending to rebut the inference of bad faith that arises
from the facts" the court offered guidance for the trial court as to the
proper measure of damages.103 The suggestion that an employee may
have a right to future profits is unparalleled in other jurisdictions;
other states only -permit discharged employees to share in profits already realized. By allowing Mitford to share in the future profits of
the corporations, the court sent two strong messages to Alaska employers: first, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing does apply to
at-will employment contracts, and second, this covenant cannot be
thwarted by accounting practices that would place a discharged em10 4
ployee "at the mercy of [his or her] former employer."
The second recent decision in Alaska demonstrating the supreme
court's willingness to protect employees was issued seven days after
05
Mitford. In Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 1
the court rejected a consideration requirement in enforcing an at-will
employment contract. The plaintiff in Eales contended that he had
been promised a job until retirement but had been fired without cause
100. Id. at 1002.
101. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
102. 666 P.2d at 1007 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at n.4.
104. Id. Although Mitford's contract called only for a share of the profits "as
determined by the rules of Federal Income Tax," i.e., those which had been realized
for purposes of tax liability, a literal application of this provision would clearly allow
the company to evade the spirit of its agreement by refusing to realize any profits
while the actual profits of the corporation continued to accrue in the form of unrealized accretions to its net worth.
105. 663 P.2d 935 (Alaska 1983).
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after only six years. Even though the defendant did not contest these
allegations, the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that a contract of employment until retirement was
for an indefinite term and was therefore terminable at will. In a twopage opinion, the supreme court reversed, announcing its "rejection of
those authorities which hold that employment contracts until retirement, or for permanent employment, or for life are necessarily terminable at the will of the employer, where the employee furnishes no
consideration in addition to the services incident to the employment."' 0 6 The court noted that, although the majority rule was to the
contrary, it felt no compulsion to follow the "unsound" rationale
based on mutuality of obligation. Quoting Corbin,' 0 7 the court held
that "permanent" employment offers need not satisfy any requirement
of mutuality of obligation because they are unilateral contracts in
which the employer's promise is supported by the employee's performance in reliance on that promise.10 8 The use of unilateral contract
analysis to sustain an employee's right to a long term of employment is
virtually unprecedented; the only other cases applying unilateral contract analysis to employment contracts dealt with the enforcement of
specific promises set forth in an employee handbook, rather than the
general promise of "permanent" employment.10 9
The third case in the Alaska Supreme Court's at-will trilogy,
Glover v. Sager, 10 is not purely an employment case. Nevertheless, it
is notable because of the theory on which the court based its decision.
The plaintiffs in Glover were truck drivers who alleged that, in reliance
on representations made by Sager and his agents, they had given up
their jobs as drivers for Sager's company to become owner-operators
of trucks under lease to Sager. When they complained about not receiving tariff increases that allegedly had been promised them, Sager
terminated their truck leases, thus depriving them of their livelihood
as effectively as though they had been discharged from their original
106. Id. at 959.
107. Id. at 960, quoting IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152, at 14
(1963).
108. This recalls the illustration of a unilateral contract usually given by the instructors in first-year contracts courses. The hypothetical usually involves A's offer of
five or ten dollars if B will climb a flagpole or walk across the Brooklyn Bridge. In
both instances it might be said that B's acceptance creates an employment contract.
109. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) (application of unilateral contract analysis to uphold termination procedures in employee
handbook); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 566 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977) (applying
unilateral contract analysis to issue of whether employee was entitled to severance pay
promised in employee handbook).
110. 667 P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1983).
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jobs. 1 The superior court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints with
prejudice, but the supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that
the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of promissory estoppel.
The holding in Glover, like that in Eales, is a clear departure from
the majority rule on at-will employment contracts. Most courts have
held that reliance by an at-will employee on an employer's promise
cannot give rise to promissory estoppel because the at-will nature of
the relationship precludes reasonable reliance." 2 A few courts recognize a cause of action in promissory estoppel for employees who give
up one job in reliance on the promise of a new job with another employer.1 3 Nonetheless, some of these courts have held that this cause
of action is only theoretically available, noting that the employee can
show no legally cognizable damages since he could have been fired
immediately after starting the new job.' 14 Thus, by holding that the
plaintiffs in Glover had made out a prima facie case of promissory estoppel in the context of an existing employment relationship, ' 5 the
Supreme Court of Alaska again clearly rejected the majority position
on at-will employment contracts.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Mitford, Eales, and Glover decisions represent a notable de-

parture from traditional precepts of employment at will. The Supreme
Court of Alaska is the first American court to analyze employment-atwill contracts in terms of ordinary contract law instead of applying the
"special rules" developed during the laissez-faire period.'1,6 Although
this type of analysis constitutes a radical departure from the analysis
accepted elsewhere under the rubric of the "American rule," the departure is warranted by changes in American society. Perhaps the
rapid industrialization of the country required that "masters" of industry be free to discharge their "servants" at will. Further, perhaps

the relatively unsophisticated "servants" of the industrialization era
111. In fact, the employees may have been worse off since they now had truck
payments and expenses to meet.
112. See, e.g., Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 418 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1982).
113. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Pepsi Cola
Gen. Bottlers, Inc. v. Woods, 440 N.E.2d 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Grouse v. Group
Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981); Morsinkhoffv. DeLuxe Laundry &
Dry Cleaning Co., 344 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. 1961).
114. This was the holding of the courts in Pepsi Cola and Morsinkhoff See supra
note 113.
115. It could be argued, of course, that the change in the type of relationship from
that of employee/driver to independent contractor was analogous to starting a new
job but the facts indicate so much continuity that characterizing the change as more
akin to a transfer or promotion in an existing job seems more realistic.
116. See supra Part II.
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may have been in danger of being exploited had they not been free to
leave their jobs at will. Today, however, employers and employees
should be free to bargain for the terms of their contracts.
The Alaska Supreme Court's recent trilogy of contract cases involving the employment-at-will rule indicates a willingness to protect
employees from abuses of the employer's power to "fire at will." The
attitude reflected in these cases suggests that the court would also be
willing to find a cause of action for employees discharged in derogation of public policy. Nonetheless, the court should not be required to
bear the burden of adjudicating public policy cases on an ad hoe basis.
The legislature should set out clear limits on an employer's right to
discharge at-will employees. Specifically, the legislature should consider protecting employees' rights to serve on juries, to file claims for
work-related injuries, to refuse to participate in abortions, and to report violations of law to the proper authorities. In so doing, the legislature would continue the positive and progressive trend set by the
Alaska Supreme Court.

